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Abstract: Nelson Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom provides evidence organized in the 
form of antecedent-behavior-consequence units, which suggest that a shaping process 
effected during his many years of incarceration best describes the origins of the outcome 
represented by the political order in South Africa following his release. The analysis 
shows that Mandela’s radicalism at the start of his imprisonment on Robben Island 
changed into a saintly presidential aura in the end, through a systematic selection process 
that actively involved Mandela himself and his political aspirations. The saintly qualities 
ascribed to Mandela after his release by many around the world are consistent with 
Skinner’s (1971) views on autonomous man. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To many around the world, the current political dispensation in South Africa 
represents the triumph of the black struggle spearheaded by Nelson Mandela and 
his colleagues and aided by international sanctions against the hateful apartheid 
system it  replaced. A  reading of  Mandela’s own  account of  events tends to 
validate this view generally. Mandela’s autobiography suggests, however, certain 
undercurrents that significantly influenced the final outcome. It appears two 
important forces collided to yield the current modus vivendi that South Africa 
represents: namely, the undeclared political aspirations of Nelson Mandela and 
some of his colleagues, and the authorities’ covert work on the ANC leadership in 
captivity, particularly Nelson Mandela himself. What appears fortuitous many 
times may have been force majeure – apparently unavoidable circumstances that 
occurred due to the dictates of the apartheid authorities, especially during the later 
years in the Robben Island and Pollsmoor Prisons. Some of these will be 
highlighted in what follow, prima facie. The veracity of the conclusions reached 
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here may rest, in part, on the accounts rendered by the other actors in the drama 
represented by Mandela’s journey (e.g., see Sparks, 1994). Mandela’s (1994) 
Long Walk to Freedom is a rich source of material for those interested in verbal 
and rule-governed behavior, verbal self-report as data (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 
1980), control techniques for the management of behavior especially in 
corrections (e.g., Cohen & Filipczak, 1989; Ellis, 1992), say-do and do-say 
correspondences (e.g., Baer, Detrich, & Weninger, 1988; Ward & Stare, 1990), 
memory (e.g., Neisser, 1982) and remembering (e.g., Neisser & Fivush, 1994), 
and so on. A major focus in the present paper is the shaping processes in what 
Mandela’s autobiography reveals. Autobiographical reports are valuable 
psychological data (Barlow, 1981; see also Neisser, 1994) and may be quite 
useful for the study of political behavior (c.f., Hermann, 1986) and the nexus this 
may share with incarceration and reform of dissidents in prisons across the globe. 
The shaping procedure in the laboratory may be so simple and basic to 
operant psychology that we are liable to neglect its significance in the control of 
behavior. Outside the laboratory, the dynamics of control of behavior can be 
intricate and fascinating. As Skinner (1974) pointed out, institutions exercise 
awesome control over individual behavior, reinforcing their exertion by those 
who run them and engendering countercontrol by those at the receiving end. To 
say that operant psychology has much to offer society as we seek solutions to 
human problems is not a new claim. What is new is that more than thirty-five 
years since the publication of Beyond Freedom and Dignity, we have some new 
evidence for the kinds of control of human behavior B. F. Skinner talked about 
that raised so many eyebrows. The evidence in the Long Walk to Freedom is vast 
and compelling. In the absence of an official admission, it is not impossible to 
make a case beyond Mandela’s own account to support the possibility of an actual 
program implemented for the protagonists who served with him in the various 
prisons he visited with his colleagues in the present case. Nevertheless, for the 
purposes of this paper, I will stay within Mandela’s autobiographical text for 
direct evidence, for the most part, to illustrate the shaping processes involved. I 
think this is psychologically, and more specifically behaviorally, more interesting 
and challenging. Skinner’s (1974) notions of control and countercontrol are 
quintessentially illustrated. Furthermore, as discussed further below, his (Skinner, 
1971) double-edged ideas about autonomous man present separate but related 
issues of how individual action is credited traditionally and how a science of 
behavior appears to take that credit away. The aftermath of Mandela’s release and 
rise to the South African presidency was characterized by a saintly ascription to 
him and his achievements. Whereas one could seek and find some hints in 
Mandela’s account, clearly, much of such evidence would come from extra-
 autobiographical sources, beyond the contents of his memoir. To render an 
integrated behavior analytic perspective on Mandela’s story requires that both his 
experiences under incarceration and after release get adequate consideration here. 
Before I present the shaping analyses, however, it may be useful to present an 
overview of Mandela’s account to provide some context in which to place the 
subsequent analyses. Given the emphases on Mandela’s text and the extent and 
depth of the participation of various individuals, organizations, institutions, and 
government entities involved in his narrative, it seems only appropriate to offer a 
glimpse of the chronological content and structure rendered by his account in 
what comes next. A discussion of shaping and its relevance to Mandela’s case 
then follows, with its ramifications for his saintly portrayal and the notion of an 
autonomous man. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MANDELA’S ACCOUNT 
Mandela’s account of his life as a co-extension of the African National 
Congress (ANC) begins in earnest in Part 3 of Long Walk to Freedom, when 
Walter Sisulu introduced him to the organization. Covering the period from 1944 
to early 1950s, it marked the formation of the Congress Youth League (CYL) in 
1944 and the assumption of the Defiance Campaign of 1952, culminating in the 
arrest, trial, and conviction, with suspended 9-month sentences, of 21 leaders of 
the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the CYL, including 
Mandela. Spanning the period between 1952 and 1956, Part 4 opens with the 
effective ascension of Mandela to the National Executive Committee (NEC) of 
the ANC at the end of 1952, followed by a series of banning orders imposed on 
him and others. These were busy times, witnessing the birth of the Mandela-Plan 
(or M-Plan) for the underground operation of the ANC in anticipation of 
government ban of the organization and the organization of the failed Sophiatown 
removal protests. Mandela opened his own law offices with Oliver Tambo and 
successfully defended his case with the Law Society of the Transvaal, which 
wanted to eliminate him from the roll of accredited attorneys. Mandela helped 
Walter Sisulu organize a trip to Bucharest and China without NEC approval, and 
offered a burgeoning rationale for armed struggle. 
Part 5 describes the arrest and protracted treason trial of 156 individuals—
blacks, Indians, whites, and coloureds—lasting between December 1956 and 
March 1961, and ending with the Verdict of not guilty. In Part 6, Mandela went 
underground—practically from the court—and out to the rest of Africa where he 
generally received “royal” treatment. This trip occurred sometime between 
February and August 1962. Before the trip, Mandela argued for and obtained 
approval to begin an armed struggle, and was empowered to form a military wing 
of the ANC; hence, the birth of Umkhonto we Sizwe, or MK, with Nelson 
Mandela, Joe Slovo, and Walter Sisulu on its High Command. During his 
extensive tour of Africa, Mandela underwent military training in Ethiopia, 
effectively establishing his terrorist credentials. 
Part 7 (August 1962 to June 12, 1964) takes us through the Rivonia trial for 
sabotage, which led to life sentences for most of the defendants, including 
Mandela, and their eventual incarceration on Robben Island. In Part 8, Mandela 
describes the agonizing indignities they suffered on Robben Island during the first 
five years of incarceration (covering 1964 to 1969) including hard labor, amidst 
nerve-racking prison routines, which they fought at every opportunity, suffering 
severe consequences as a result. Inhuman visiting hours and protocols, censorship 
of personal letters, race-based diets, and solitary confinement were among the 
many hardships they experienced on the Island. 
Covering 1969 to 1982, Part 9 presents more relaxed prison conditions: 
phasing out manual labor altogether; introduction of religious services, concerts, 
films, drama; access to books and newspapers; attempts to woo Mandela to 
government’s Bantu policies; and radio broadcasts by the prison authorities. 
Mandela, urged by Ahmed Kathrada and Walter Sisulu, started writing his 
memoirs; a large portion was discovered by the authorities and seized. Arrests 
during the Soweto Uprising brought younger, more militant activists to the Island, 
and Mandela and his colleagues encountered the next generation of freedom 
fighters. The part concluded with the move of only four of the old-timers, 
Mandela, Sisulu, Mlangeni, and Mhlaba, to Pollsmoor maximum-security prison 
in the Cape. 
Life has so much changed and improved in Pollsmoor Prison in Part 10 that 
the reader might wonder, in many places, if Mandela was incarcerated still. It 
covers the period between 1982, on arriving at this “five-star (prison) hotel,” and 
1990, with arguments over the manner of Mandela’s release in February. Talks 
about talks began here, initiated by Mandela who, by this time, had been 
separated from his colleagues brought to Pollsmoor with him; part of the 
separation took Mandela to another prison, Victor Verster (in 1988) where he 
lived in a cottage by himself, with an official cook at his service. 
Part 11 witnesses the release of Mandela. He began his travels and meetings 
with world leaders amidst unexpected increase in violence around South Africa. 
Consultations began with the ANC in exile, and when unbanned, at home. There 
were negotiations about negotiations, and then the negotiations started. The death 
of Oliver Tambo marked Mandela’s ascension to ANC presidency, the national 
elections were held, and of course, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president 
of South Africa. 
 As noted in the foregoing, much of the memoirs in Long Walk to Freedom 
originated from Robben Island at the urging and behest of Ahmed Kathrada and 
Walter Sisulu when Mandela turned fifty-seven, intended for publication on his 
sixtieth birthday. Although originally meant “... to remind people of what we had 
fought and were still fighting for,” (Mandela, 1994, p. 462; my emphases) the 
memoirs, upon their seizure, provided the authorities valuable information on the 
movement, its leadership, tactics and strategies, policies and values, and the 
tenacity and weaknesses of those who count most in the ANC. The value of the 
discovered manuscripts to the authorities cannot be overestimated for serving as a 
basis for conducting a systematic, covert work on the ANC leadership in 
captivity, including Nelson Mandela himself. A good part of such work would 
consist of molding their behavior toward a goal the apartheid authorities 
considered desirable.i Mandela’s own account of events strongly suggests that this 
may well have happened, systematically or otherwise—in the parlance of 
behavior analysis, shaping. 
SHAPING AND OTHER RELATED PROCEDURES 
As old as the discovery of the operant by B. F. Skinner in the 1930s, shaping 
is a well-established procedure in behavior analysis (see Skinner, 1953). 
Discussions of the procedure in the literature tend to be cursory, however, with 
the notable exception of the use of percentile schedules (e.g., Galbicka, 1994). 
Shaping has its effects on behavior from differential reinforcement of successive 
approximations to a specified target behavior. It involves a series of reinforcement 
and extinction contingencies whereby the consequence during reinforcement 
establishes a class of responses but the removal of the consequence during 
extinction increases variability in behavior. From the variations, the next return to 
reinforcement selects new approximations to the terminal behavior, and so on. 
Typical laboratory procedures often involve shaping behaviors of individual 
participants. The procedure, however, can be implemented as effectively to shape 
the behavior of a group of participants (e.g., Burnstein & Wolff, 1964), as was 
occasionally evident in the case presented in Mandela’s account. It takes artful 
practice and experience to implement successfully, and it can be impressively 
effective. Patience, of course, is indispensable. Once behavior gets going, 
eventually, the target is realized.  
Galbicka (1994) identified four basic verbal rules for the shaping of the 
behavior of organisms. The first of these rules is to begin at the subject’s current 
repertoire; that is, where the subject’s response happens to be presently. The 
second rule is to explicitly specify the terminal response; that is, where the 
subject’s response will end (the target behavior). The third rule is to use small 
steps toward the target. The final rule is to reinforce movement, rather than 
position. When followed, these rules are generally effective in establishing new 
behaviors or reinstituting old ones. The procedure can thus move the behavior 
back and forth at will to the specification of the shaper. It is important to note, 
however, that shaping, like many other behavioral processes, is a dynamic and 
reciprocal process, as illustrated further below.  
Various aspects of Galbicka’s (1994) rules are discernible in the evidence 
provided in Mandela’s text as outlined below. In addition to these, however, other 
techniques such as those identified by Skinner (1971) in his discussions on 
“changing minds” are present; namely, prompting, hinting and suggesting, setting 
examples, and urging and persuading. As Skinner noted, “[p]rompts, hints, and 
suggestions are all stimuli usually but not always verbal, and they have the 
important property of exerting only partial control” (1971, pp. 92-93). As 
discriminative and/or antecedent stimuli, combining these techniques with the 
rules outlined by Galbicka, however, present a rather potent arsenal of tools for 
modifying human behavior in desired directions.  
In the case of Mandela and his colleagues, one can only speculate on the 
specifics of the targets set by the authorities. For example, according to Sparks, 
having been appointed to the special committee on discussions with Mandela in 
May 1988, around 1989, “Niël Barnard had a brief to sound the ANC leader 
[Mandela] out on three issues: Was he prepared to accept that violence was not a 
way to solve South Africa’s political problems? What was his attitude to 
communism, given the ANC’s long-standing alliance with the South African 
Communist Party? And did he still insist on majority rule, or was he prepared to 
settle for something else?” (1994, p. 48). A general outline thus is discernible 
from available accounts that would include either a recommitment to previously 
held positions or commitments to new ones by Mandela and his colleagues, as 
determined by the authorities. Whatever the specifics were, undoubtedly, the 
political outcome that followed in South Africa would be within their frame of 
reference. 
Events and actions of the authorities evident from Mandela’s accounts 
suggest that the authorities had ways and means to achieve that outcome. At least, 
Sparks’ account displays quite a wider array of sources in the authorities’ arsenal 
of information gathering in this regard than is discernible (understandably) from 
Mandela’s account. As shown in Figure 1, the sources included but were not 
necessarily limited to George Bizos, Mandela’s lawyer and Piet de Waal,ii the 
lone-lawyer in Brandfort, Orange Free State, where Winnie Mandela was 
banished in 1977. Both of these men reported to Kobie Coetsee, the minister of 
justice (see Sparks, 1994, pp. 16-20, 29-31). Also, Pieter de Lange, the Broeder-
 bond chairman, “spoke regularly with [P. W.] Botha” (p. 74), and the academic, 
Esterhuyse, reported to Niël Barnard, the head of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) just as F. W. de Klerk’s brother, Willem de Klerk, reported to his 
brother (pp. 78-79). This array of resources and networks would have been 
buttressed, of course, by the discovery of the manuscripts of Mandela’s memoirs 
on Robben Island. The manuscript would have helped them to determine where 
the ANC leadership, individually and collectively, stood on pertinent political and 
ideological issues and other matters of interest to the authorities for them to 
achieve their desired goals. From there, they could set the process in motion. 
These then represent Rules 1 and 2 of shaping (Galbicka, 1994) in Mandela’s 
case, in rough outline. 
Purely from Mandela’s own account of events,iii I think a case can be made 
that some program was in place, in one form or another, to achieve the state of 
affairs in the South Africa led by Nelson Mandela. One line of evidence for such a 
program is a measure of the continuity of contacts by staff with the ANC 
leadership in captivity, particularly, Mandela. His account indicates a number of 
durable contacts, some notably covering his stay in Robben Island, Pollsmoor, 
and Victor Verster Prisons, or combinations there in. Durations of contact, for 
example, of four years or more include those with Warrant Officer James 
Gregory, Brigadier Aucamp, Brigadier Fred Munro, General W. H. Willemse, 
General Steyn, and Jimmy Kruger (see also Sparks, 1994). Sparks noted, “James 
Gregory… spent a total of twenty-four years guarding Mandela in three different 
prisons…,” (1994, p. 22) for example. He mentions a General Johan Willemse (p. 
24) as commissioner of prisons; it is unclear if this refers to W. H. Willemse who 
held the same position in Mandela’s account. 
According to Rules 3 and 4 of shaping outlined by Galbicka (1994), 
differential reinforcement of successive approximations to the target behavior 
should aim at movement, rather than position, and in small steps. To explore how 
these rules are represented in Mandela’s case, an antecedent-behavior-
consequence (ABC) analysis provides a useful tool, because of the complexity of 
the interactions among the various protagonists involved, individually and 
collectively, and the wide ranging events that occur over temporally and 
environmentally disparate contexts. By using the ABC units of analysis, we 
achieve a framework that is consistent with the behavior-analytic perspective 
from which the thrust of the entire paper derives. The approach adopted in 
creating the ABC sequences was simply to try to isolate incidences, personalities, 
institutions, and events that might have constituted the elements, A, B, and/or C 
along the way, recognizing the starting (as a “terrorist”) and end (as president of 
South Africa) points in Mandela’s narrative. The three (A, B, and C) terms are 
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 Figure 1. A network of contacts between non-South African businessmen, Afrikaner business and 
church leaders, members and leaders of the Afrikaner Broederbond, academics, and government 
officials, on the one hand, and the ANC leadership in exile and Nelson Mandela in prison, on the 
other. Arrow heads indicate points of initial contact; dashed lines indicate lines of clandestine 
communications with government officials; lines without arrows indicate formal and/or informal 
meetings; dashed box indicates a one-time contact; and filled dots and square indicate frequent 
and regular flow of information and/or funds, respectively. Based on Sparks’ (1994) accounts. 
 
 
used in the broadest sense as organizing aids without pretext to specialized usage 
as in, for example, distinguishing among discriminative, motivational, and/or 
general contextual antecedents. Significant as well was how the world and the 
authorities perceived him (e.g., as saint and leader, respectively) and his roles at 
various points in the journey. In considering these, recognizing how, when, and 
why movement occurred in his behavior or views, as well as of those in authority, 
was critical. Absent any specific psychological analysis or point of view in his 
narrative, these elements had to be “extracted,” so to speak, from its pages. 
Consequently, temporal gaps in the ABC sequences appear in the presentation, 
which mostly, but not necessarily always, correspond to gaps in the events and 
persons described in Mandela’s narrative.  
AN ANTECEDENT-BEHAVIOR-CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS  
The apartheid authorities released Mandela from prison in February 1990 
after a long process of what might be characterized as negotiations. I will argue in 
the following, however, that his account of the events leading to that point 
suggests some program of conditioning, a process, I believe, that might have 
begun some twenty years before. Accordingly, the shaping process appears to 
have evolved over four general phases beginning early, in earnest, in the Robben 
Island prison; indeed, soon upon the arrival of Mandela and the other high caliber 
political prisoners on the island. The followings represent some evidence in the 
form of ABC units (some presented in frames) to illustrate the shaping 
contingencies discernible from Mandela’s account. 
Phase 1: Robben Island Prison 
Phase 1 took place on Robben Island. It consisted of disciplinary actions by 
the prison authorities, their active selection of Nelson Mandela from among his 
colleagues who were his coequals and superiors, both in age and “rank,” and the 
assumption of leadership roles by Mandela among his colleagues, the general 
prison population, and in Transkei politics. Some evidence on each of these 
aspects follows next in the form of ABC sequences. The events or incidences are 
in rough chronological order. 
Discipline. The first steps taken by the authorities were to establish obedience 
and subservience firmly among the new arrivals by imposing very severe 
penalties for not following orders. Several ABC events involving disciplinary 
action to control, modify, or curtail the behavior of Mandela and his colleagues in 
captivity occurred early during their incarceration. Countercontrol incidents or 
measures are indicated in parentheses where they occur. 
The first disciplinary incident occurred soon after Mandela and his colleagues 
arrived on Robben Island in 1964. When a prison guide asked one of his 
colleagues, Kathy, to take a wheelbarrow filled with gravel to a truck (A), 
Mandela attempted to help him (B), resulting in severe consequences for not only 
Mandela and Kathy, but all the political prisoners in their group (C; collective). 
They were to half-fill a large skip by the week’s end. In protest, the group decided 
on a go-slow strike (B; collective; countercontrol), which resulted in an even 
more severe penalty for as long as the strike continued; three-quarters skip by 
week 2 and full skip by week 3 (C; collective). In a second incidence, two weeks 
into their prison term, Mandela was presented with short trousers (A) but he 
demanded to see the head of prison (HOP) with a list of complaints (B). His 
requests were ignored by the warders initially but were finally granted (C), only 
for Mandela to refuse (B; countercontrol) because similar trousers were not issued 
for his colleagues. The HOP himself took away the pair from Mandela (C). The 
latter incidence appears designed to show Mandela that when a bridge of order 
was to occur, it would have to be on terms set by the authorities. Another 
disciplinary incidence occurred the following year when Mandela was placed in 
four days of isolation (C) for disobeying orders to return to work (B) at the quarry 
during a visit by Brig. Aucamp with the Commanding Officer (CO; A). 
Insubordination was not to be tolerated, especially not when it was against the 
wishes of the prison authorities. Yet another disciplinary incidence occurred 
sometime in 1971 after Col. Piet Badenhorst arrived on the island as CO and 
amidst worsening prison conditions. Badenhorst had provoked (A) Mandela into 
insolence, the latter angrily approached without orders to do so (B), resulting in 
collective punishment for all the men at the quarry (C; collective). Nevertheless, 
Mandela was still pinpointed as a scapegoat to restore order (C; individual; see 
Frame 1). 
Selection of Mandela for leadership roles. To appreciate the full extent of this 
aspect of the process under consideration, one must understand that, quite early 
on, the authorities appeared to nurture Mandela’s leadership potential on Robben 
Island, not only among the general inmates, but also within the High Organ and 
 Frame 1. Amidst improved prison conditions (Chapter 71), conversations with 
warders—Boss escape plan through a warder in 1969; end of 1970, Col. van Aarde 
replaced by Col. Piet Badenhorst (PB) as CO cutting short the former’s tenure (443-
444) and turning back the clocks on improvement in prison life and conditions (444-45) 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
1971? 
One week after 
PB’s arrival 
PB: “Mandela, you 
must pull your 
finger out of your 
arse” (an insult) 
(individual) 
 
NM angrily 
approaches PB (B) 
PB ordered all back 
to their prison 
section; addresses 
them, drops their 
classifications by 
one (collective 
effect) and then 
pinpoints NM as 
scapegoat to restore 
order (individual) 
 
 
among the other political prisoners. Indications to this effect include their initial 
insistence that there be no spokesman among the prisoners, on the one hand, and 
the manner in which prison rules and regulations were selectively applied and 
enforced by the prison authorities, on the other. According to Mandela,  
The prison service regulations were explicit that each prisoner was permitted to speak 
only for himself. This was done to negate the power of organization and to neutralize 
our collective strength… We were not even permitted to use the word we when we 
make complaints [emphasis in original]. But during the first few years, when the 
authorities needed one prisoner to speak on behalf of others, that individual would be 
me. (1994, p. 382; my emphases) 
He provides ample evidence. For example, by the end of their second week 
on the island, Bram Fisher and Joel Joffe had paid them their first attorney’s visit 
since the trials (A). Mandela offered (B) to write a condolence letter to Bram for 
loss of his wife, which he did and submitted to the major, but it was not mailed 
(C). Only days afterwards, Mandela was taken with others to the head office for 
finger printing, etc. (A), for which he demanded to see authorization documents 
as required by regulations (i.e., speaking for the others; B), but was not sanctioned 
for the challenge; not only was he not sanctioned, the photos were not taken either 
(C). This is, of course, in sharp contrast to the usual disciplinary actions the 
authorities dished out for disobedience of orders. This appears to represent a 
 successive approximation to the kind of leadership roles Mandela was intended to 
assume among inmates. For, a few weeks subsequently, the London-based Daily 
Telegraph reporters visited the prison on what was the first such official visit to 
the prisoners. Against prison regulations, Mandela was chosen to speak on behalf 
of the others. During a subsequent visit by Hynning from the American Bar 
Association, the other prisoners chose Mandela to speak for them when they were 
asked to choose a spokesman by General Steyn. Soon afterwards, warders beat up 
a PAC member, Ganya (A). Mandela took up his case as an attorney and 
demanded that the warder be removed from the island (B). His request was 
initially refused, but shortly after, the warder was transferred from Robben Island 
(C). Indeed, when the Red Cross visited later, Mandela was the one called to the 
head office. Effectively, Mandela was assuming a veritable role among his 
coequals and superior colleagues as de facto leader of the group both in the ANC 
leadership in captivity and in the general prison population. 
Mandela’s assumption of leadership roles. The process continued, of course. 
The next stage presented further instances illustrating how Mandela’s role as 
leader among the prison population was promoted by a series of successive 
approximations, leading to substantive leadership role-playing. Many of the 
incidences here represent countercontrol (identified below) for the most part. 
Mandela began to take leadership initiatives, initially with others. Some time 
about 1965, for example, there had been warder hostility at the quarry (A), 
Mandela assigned a comrade to befriend a warder who took the latter’s jacket to 
sit on, and Mandela lets the comrade accept a sandwich the warder threw on the 
ground (B; collaborative). The warder became friendly to them and asked about 
the ANC, etc. (C; collective). In a different example in September 1966, 
Verwoerd had been stabbed to death, and white South Africa was in shock (A). 
The anger spilled over to affect life severely on Robben Island, as personified by 
the viciousness of Von Rensburg to the political prisoners at the quarry (B). 
Mandela organized a legal advisory team with Mac and Fiki for other inmates to 
forestall the increasing prison court actions against inmates (C; countercontrol). 
Subsequently, however, Mandela began to take these initiatives by himself.  
After May 1971, following the aforementioned disciplinary downgrading of 
the political prisoners’ classification and scapegoating of Mandela (see Frame 1), 
the three Cape judges visited in summer of 1971 (A). During their visit, Mandela 
complained to them about assaults and other matters (B; see Mandela, 1994, pp. 
448 for exchange). The harsh conditions in prison abated thereafter and three 
months later, the HOP and other aggressive warders were transferred from 
Robben Island (C). At this point, Col. Willemse took charge, marking the 
beginning of good things to come. Interestingly, it was Col. Willemse who, much 
  
like in the mid-1960s, bent the prison rules. Subsequent events showed how when 
the prisoners started to talk rather than work at the quarry (A), Willemse, against 
prison regulations, allowed Mandela to organize a general meeting (B) during 
which the prisoners decided that they would appear to work (C). That quelled 
complaints and “work” resumes (countercontrol). Once during 1971-72, a dispute 
between an MK man, Jimmy April, and a prison official over a letter arose (A), 
and Mandela intervened, preventing an “attack” from Jimmy (B). One week later, 
Mandela was the one the prison official handed the letter to, not Jimmy (C). By 
1972 when Lt. Terblanche was HOP, the prison atmosphere was so relaxed (A) 
that he partook in the prisoners’ mussel (B) and, rather than take punitive action, 
simply praised their food (C; countercontrol). 
A series of incidents occurred in the mid-1970s (Frame 2; note that grayed 
events represent countercontrol incidents) that may have served as important 
contexts for subsequent events. Zindzi had visited Mandela. After the visit, Lt. 
Prin, the then HOP made insulting remarks about Mandela’s wife (A). Mandela 
was angry and was verbally abusive (B). Charged (C, A), Mandela brought a 
countersuit (C, B) for which he prepared a case with G. Bizos as his lawyer, 
brought it to court himself (A), the case against him was withdrawn (B; 
countercontrol), and his prepared case was confiscated, providing access to 
Mandela’s case documents (C; countercontrol; see Frame 2 for further details). It 
was during this period too that the authorities discovered his memoirs. Both of 
these incidents, in my view, would have provided considerable insight for the 
authorities into Mandela’s thinking, legal and political, on matters of great 
significance to them. For example, after the memoirs were seized (A), Jimmy 
Kruger, the minister of prison himself paid him a visit on Robben Island to urge 
him to recognize the Transkei government (B). Similar offers were made 
subsequently and Mandela turned them all down (C; countercontrol; see Frame 2). 
By 1980, Transkei politics took a different turn. Matanzima, Mandela’s 
nephew, deposed Sabata Dalindyebo as King of the Thembus (A). The authorities 
approved a meeting sought by Thembu chiefs (B) and, against the wishes of his 
colleagues on Robben Island, Mandela met with them (C). However, when 
Matanzima sought another approved audience with Mandela with government 
approval (A) and the latter was met with very strong objections from members of 
the High Organ and people in the general prison population (B), Mandela turned 
down the visit (C). In March 1982, Mandela was informed that his wife, Winnie 
Mandela, was involved in an automobile accident and was in hospital, but nothing 
more (A). Mandela wanted to see his lawyer, but his wife’s lawyer came instead 
 

 By 1985, the ANC High Organ on Robben Island, with Mlangeni, had moved 
up the luxury scale to Pollsmoor Prison, to be joined a few weeks later by 
Kathrada, their chief of communications on Robben Island. In late 1984 and early 
1985, the minister of justice, Kobie Coetsee, authorized two important visits, one 
from Lord Nicholas Bethel of the British House of Lords and European 
Parliament, and another from Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University. 
During these meetings, Mandela expressed his political views, with South African 
officials present in one of them. Armed with such position statements, the 
apartheid government was prepared for a political response of its own. On 31 
January 1985, P. W. Botha challenged Nelson Mandela to renounce violence for 
his freedom (see Frame 3) – this, according to Mandela, being the sixth such offer 
in ten years, and he had been prompted by the authorities to expect it, only they 
did not say it would be made in Parliament.v 
That same year, instead of replying to a letter Mandela had written to him 
pressing for talks, the minister of justice pays him a personal visit at Volks 
hospitalvi where he had undergone surgery for an enlarged prostate gland (see 
Frame 4, a). Upon discharge from the hospital, Brigadier Munro, the CO himself 
picked up Mandela, an unusual occurrence in the South African prison system. 
Moreover, upon arriving Pollsmoor, he was taken to a new cell, effectively 
separated from the High Organ, and thence, alone (see Frame 4, b). It was in this 
“splendid isolation” (Mandela, 1994, p. 514) that Mandela began to pursue, 
unilaterally, talks with the government (see Frame 4, c), clandestinely! In early 
1986, Mandela had been fitted for an outfit in preparation for a meeting with the 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) vii when a smiling Brig. Munro retorted, 
“Mandela, you look like a prime minister now, not a prisoner” (1994, p. 517; 
Frame 4, d). This was verbal priming per force; technically known as prompting, 
such verbal statement would serve as a cue for Mandela’s behavior or 
performance at the impending meeting with General Olusegun Obasanjo of the 
EPG. That he did perform well is reflected in the impression he gave even 
Coetsee at the start of that meeting. 
 At the meeting with General Obasanjo, Mandela had requested another 
meeting with all the members of the EPG. A meeting was set for May 1986. At 
that meeting, Mandela expressed a number of very important political positions. 
Coetsee and General Willemse were present for a part of the meeting. In effect, 
Mandela told the group that Oliver Tambo was the ANC leader and they should 
speak to him; he favors dialogue with government, but he was not ready to 
renounce violence, even though violence was not an ultimate solution. Instead, he 
desired withdrawal of government troops from the townships and warned that his 
own release would not reduce the violence raging in the townships. Just before the  
Frame 3. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
Late 1984,early 
1985 
Government testing 
the waters: Kobie 
Coetsee (KC) 
approves visits for 
Lord Bethel (1984) 
and Prof. Dash 
(1985) 
 
During meetings, 
NM discusses: 
- conditions at PP 
- armed struggle: 
government to 
renounce violence, 
not ANC 
- ANC targets 
military, not people 
(with Bethel; Maj. 
Sittert present to 
monitor) 
- minimum 
requirements for 
non-racial South 
Africa (SA): 
 + unitary state 
 + no homelands 
 + non-racial 
elections 
 + one-person, one-
vote 
- need for political 
equality, not 
cosmetic changes; 
could make 
governing difficult 
for government 
(with Dash; no 
mention of SA 
officials present) 
31 January 1985, P. 
W. Botha 
challenges NM 
specifically to 
renounce violence 
for his freedom; 
NM granted request 
to see wife and 
lawyer after a 
week’s delay 
(meeting allowed 
Friday, 8 
February), NM’s 
response to Botha 
read at the UDF 
rally, Sunday 10 
February. 
 
 
next agreed meeting with the EPG, P. W. Botha ordered raids on ANC targets in 
Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and the EPG left South Africa in protest and 
Mandela’s efforts appeared stalled (Frame 5). It remains unclear what specific 
part of Mandela’s stated positions (e.g., that Tambo was the ANC leader or that  
 Frame 4. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
1985 
(a) 
 
NM had written to 
KC, no reply; NM 
admitted to Volks 
for surgery 
 
KC makes personal 
visit to NM at 
bedside; NM 
requests permission 
for WM to remain 
in Johannesburg; 
KC promises to 
look into it; NM 
thanks him 
An “olive branch” 
from government 
 
1985: days after 
return from Volks 
(b) 
 
NM separated from 
High Organ; to see 
them, has to seek 
approval from 
Pretoria head 
office and 
conversations are 
monitored! 
NM requests a visit 
few days upon 
return from Volks 
hospital; meeting 
granted; others 
angry at the 
separation, but NM 
persuades them not 
to protest it 
NM in “splendid 
isolation” free to 
act on his own. 
 
1985 after a few 
weeks alone 
(c) 
NM alone 
 
NM writes two 
letters to KC “to 
propose talks about 
talks.” 
No replies; NM 
seeks other 
“opportunities to be 
heard” 
Feb. 1986 
(d) 
Two days before 
EPG meeting 
Brig. Munro brings 
tailor to outfit NM 
for a suit: 
“Mandela, we want 
you to see these 
people on an equal 
footing. We don’t 
want you to wear 
those old prison 
clothes, so this 
tailor will take your 
measurements and 
outfit you with a 
Munro: “Mandela, 
you look like a 
prime minister 
now, not a 
prisoner,” with a 
smile. (517) 
proper suit”; tailor 
returns following 
day with suit and 
complete wear; NM 
wears them... 
 
 
he wanted troop withdrawals, etc.) triggered such massive reaction. In June 1986, 
a state of emergency was declared nationwide in response to ANC-organized 
protests designed to make South Africa ungovernable. Mandela requested a 
meeting with Gen. Willemse and was taken promptly to Willemse from where he 
was taken to see Coetsee for a three-hour long conversation. During this meeting, 
Mandela requested a meeting with P. W. Botha, but never got one (see Frame 6, 
a-c). Mandela kept seeking dialogue with the government and the government 
kept responding with small but important gestures (see Frame 7), not dialogue. 
Apparently, requests for talks with the government were not the target behavior 
desired by the authorities in Mandela’s repertoire. Nevertheless, the process of 
shaping requires that intermediate behaviors be reinforced adequately, or they 
may be extinguished inadvertently. Hence, the “small pleasures” of Pollsmoor. 
Furthermore, prison staffs were taking him out on tours of the city of Cape 
Town. On the many tours given Mandela from Pollsmoor, Coetsee was quoted as 
saying: “What we had in mind was to expose him to the realities of the outside 
world, to prepare him for release” (Sparks, 1994, p. 38). On the early easing of 
conditions on Robben Island (see Part 9, Mandela, 1994), Coetsee had stated that 
he was sure “Mandela and his colleagues would have to be released sometime 
and that they should be prepared for that” (Sparks, 1994, p. 22; my emphases). 
From all accounts, however, it seems only Mandela was receiving this 
preparation, indicating Mandela’s special status in the authorities’ scheme of 
things (see James Gregory’s comments on these excursions and his official 
instructions in Sparks, 1994, pp. 42, 44-45). The tours were certainly part of the 
“small pleasures” of Pollsmoor, albeit extended only to Mandela (see note 7). Not 
surprisingly (see further discussions below), all the while, he was not in dialogue 
with his colleagues in Lusaka or three floors above him in Pollsmoor Prison.  
In 1987, when Coetsee informed Mandela of a presidential committee to 
meet with him for private discussions (A), he agreed to the committee but wanted 
to inform his other colleagues in Pollsmoor (B). Only after Mandela complained 
to top officials was he allowed to talk to them, but only individually (Frame 8)! 
This, then, was a “splendid isolation” that would have been rather conducive to a 
program of conditioning of Mandela’s individual actions, verbal and otherwise. 
 Frame 5. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
Early Feb. 1986 
 
NM, meeting with 
Gen. Obasanjo, 
head of EPG, seeks 
meeting with the 
whole group; 
meeting set for 
May 
 
May 1986: at the 
meeting, KC and 
Lt. Gen. Willemse, 
Commissioner of 
Prison (COP) 
present initially 
then left; with EPG, 
NM: 
- Oliver Tambo is 
leader of ANC 
- They speak to him 
in Lusaka 
- His (NM’s?) 
views are personal 
-Favors ANC 
starting dialogue 
with government 
- SA nationalists, 
not communists 
- Firmly committed 
to non-racial society 
- Believe in 
Freedom Charter 
- White minority 
should feel secure 
in new SA 
- Talks will resolve 
ANC-government 
misunderstandings 
- Not yet willing to 
give up violence 
- Violence not 
ultimate solution 
- Suggests 
withdrawal of army 
and police from 
townships for ANC 
Day before next 
meeting with the 
EPG, P. W. Botha 
orders raids on 
ANC targets in 
Botswana, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe; 
EPG leaves SA; 
talks “poisoned,” 
NM’s efforts 
“stalled.” 
to suspend armed 
struggle 
- Own release won’t 
stem violence 
(EPG to return 
again same month, 
May, after Lusaka 
and Pretoria) 
 
Phase 3: Victor Verster Prison 
Discussions eventually began in 1988, with a team of President P. W. Botha’s 
working group consisting of the minister of justice, commissioner of prisons, 
director general of prisons, and head of National Intelligence Services (a curious 
addition, even to Mandela, but it did not matter to him). By December 1988, 
Mandela was moved to a cottage of his own, now, not in Pollsmoor, but Victor 
Verster. The transfer of Mandela to Victor Verster was highly significant, as was 
the sequence of events leading to it. In May 1988, the first of the meetings with 
the president’s committee had began and was held, according to Mandela, “almost 
every week for a few months, then... at irregular intervals, sometimes not for a 
month, and then suddenly every week. The meetings were usually scheduled by 
the government, but sometimes I would request a session “ (Mandela, 1994, p. 
525; my emphases). The subjects of discussion included the armed struggle, the 
ANC-SACP alliance, nationalization of the economy, and majority rule (Mandela, 
1994, pp. 525-527), all but one—namely, nationalization—being the issue on 
which Niël Barnard has been reported to hold briefs (Sparks, 1994, p. 48). Sparks 
noted, “Mandela for his part, was single-minded in wanting a meeting with 
President Botha…” (1994, p. 48; my emphases). According to Mandela, “[t]he 
meetings had a positive effect: I was told in the winter of 1988 that President 
Botha was planning to see me before the end of August” (1994, p. 528; my 
emphases). The promise of a pending meeting only served as a verbal bridge, it 
appears, as the meeting did not hold until July 5, 1989, after some 7 months at the 
cottage in Victor Verster. Thus, at the time he was moved to the cottage, “the 
meetings with the committee continued, but we were stalled on the same issues 
that had always prevented us from moving forward: the armed struggle, the 
Communist Party, and majority rule” (Mandela, 1994, p. 535). 
 
 Frame 6. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
June 1986 
(a) 
 
State of Emergency 
in response to 
nationwide 
upheaval, courtesy 
of ANC call for 
ungovernability of 
SA 
NM wrote to Gen. 
Willemse wishing 
to see him “on a 
matter of national 
importance” (on a 
Wednesday) 
By weekend, NM 
summoned by CO 
to Willemse’s 
residence in 
Pollsmoor for a 
meeting. 
Same day 
(b) 
 
At Willemse’s 
residence in 
Pollsmoor 
 
NM: “I want to see 
the minister [KC] in 
order to raise the 
question of talks”; 
Willemse phoned in 
to Cape Town; 
minister said: 
“Bring him around.” 
Within minutes, 
they left for KC’s 
official residence in 
Cape Town. 
Same day 
(c) 
At KC’s official 
residence in Cape  
Town, during three 
hours of 
conversation, KC: 
- What 
circumstances to 
renounce armed 
struggle 
-Whether or not 
NM spoke for the 
ANC as a whole 
- Constitutional 
guarantees for 
minorities in a new 
SA; 
NM responds as par 
EPG, then, KC: 
“what is the next 
step?” 
NM wants to meet 
P. W. Botha and P. 
K. Botha (foreign 
minister); KC takes 
notes, promises to 
channel information 
Both shake hands, 
NM returns to 
Pollsmoor to await 
response; but 
“nothing happened. 
Weeks and then 
months passed 
without a word 
from Coetsee. In 
some frustration, I 
wrote him another 
letter” (519) 
Frame 7. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
Dec 1986 
Christmas Eve 
Awaiting KC’s 
response; Lt. Col. 
Gawie Marx, (GM) 
deputy CO, 
casually asks NM 
out: “Mandela, 
would you like to 
see the city?” --they 
drove around Cape 
Town. After one 
hour, GM stops at a 
“quiet street” shop: 
“Would you like a 
cold drink?”; went 
into the shop, 
leaving NM 
unguarded “for the 
first time in twenty-
two years” 
NM did not attempt 
to escape 
Col. Marx returns 
with two cans of 
Coca-Cola (the first 
of many such trips 
to follow, while 
waiting for a 
response from KC) 
 
“Much as I enjoyed these little adventures, I well knew that the authorities had a motive 
other than keeping me diverted. I sensed that they wanted to acclimatize me to life in 
South Africa and, perhaps at the same time, get me so used to the pleasures of small 
freedoms that I might be willing to compromise in order to have complete freedom.” 
P. S.: “These trips were instructive on a number of levels. I saw how life had changed in 
the time I had been away, and because we mainly went to white areas, I saw the 
extraordinary wealth and ease that whites enjoyed...” (521) 
 
 
Notably, the issue of nationalization was no longer an obstacle and, by then, given 
the high frequency of the meetings, Mandela’s views on the three issues were well 
known to the committee; indeed, he was preparing a memorandum to present to 
President Botha. So, the delays in meeting Botha were having the desired effect of 
generating a great deal of verbal output by Mandela on matters of great interest to 
the committee. These represented verbal commitments on Mandela’s part (see 
Mandela, 1994,  pp. 535-536 on the memorandum,  for example).  Indeed,  con- 
 Frame 8. 
Date  Antecedent Behavior Consequence 
1987 
(a) 
KC informs NM of 
formation of “a 
committee of senior 
officials to conduct 
private discussions 
with me” with the 
“full knowledge” of 
P. W. Botha 
NM consents to the 
members of the 
committee and 
requests to meet his 
Pollsmoor 
colleagues 
The “authorities 
summarily refused” 
(b) Meeting refusal NM complained to 
high officials 
 
Meeting approved 
individually, rather 
than collectively! 
Winter 1988, NM informed he would meet P. W. Botha before the end of August; NM 
fell ill with bad cough, taken to Tygerberg Hospital, University of Stellenbosch, TB 
discovered, operation performed; six weeks later, NM transferred to Constantiaberg 
Clinic near Pollsmoor; secret meeting continued here with the committee; and KC tells 
NM he would be going to a “halfway between confinement and freedom” (530); 
nursing staff organized party for NM—they were whites and coloreds (528-31); 
December 1988, NM taken to a cottage in Victor Verster Prison (VVP) north east of 
Cape Town (532); KC visits with a case of Cape wine as a gift, and tells NM this was a 
place he could “hold discussions in privacy and comfort,” and would be his last abode 
before freedom (533); official cook provided; many and increasing visits from ANC, 
UDF, and MDM members with entertainments, meals, wines, etc., (534); limited 
contacts with colleagues at Pollsmoor, Robben Island or Lusaka (535). 
 
 
cerning the meeting with Botha, Sparks wrote: “As Coetsee says, after that 
[meeting] there was no way of stopping the process. It was just a matter of time—
and the man” (1994, p. 56; my emphases). In addition, by all accounts, the cottage 
from which Mandela was initiating these talks was a potent reinforcer for 
Mandela’s verbally expressed positions up to that point. That Mandela obtained 
the plans of the cottage and “had an exact replica built as his holiday home at 
Qunu, his birthplace in Transkei, is evidence of the potency of the pleasures of 
Victor Verster” viii (see Sparks, 1994, p. 41; see also Mandela, 1994, p. 599). By 
his move to Victor Verster, then, Mandela was “free” to consult with ANC, 
United Democratic Front (UDF) and Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) 
members who came and went to the cottage, where he entertained them, courtesy 
of the State.  
Phase 4: Free 
Talks continued. By October 1989, de Klerk had become president, talks 
continued, and Walter Sisulu and seven others were released from prison. Four 
months later, Mandela followed. Thereafter, notwithstanding inopinate escalations 
in violence all over South Africa, the talks continued, culminating in an election 
and the inauguration of Mandela as President in a government of national unity, 
based on proportional representation or power sharing. 
SYNOPSIS AND DISCUSSION 
It appears that once the authorities got Mandela talking about talking, the 
business of shaping was well underway; what remained was fine-tuning, to get 
him saying whatever they wanted to hear, in the form of commitments to desired 
positions and denouncement of undesirable positions. Indeed, this would be 
consistent with any program of behavior change. As Miller rightly pointed out, 
Regardless of the moral considerations involved, the technical problem faced by the 
brainwasher [includes].... how can I get him to speak the speech I wish him to, publicly 
and apparently voluntarily?...because making such a speech may convince the prisoner 
himself and so make his future behavior more predictably loyal or consistent with 
established standards, or because if he speaks or writes the desired words, they may be 
recorded...and used to affect the behavior of others. (1957, p. 48)  
The authorities must have spotted Mandela’s propensity for going it alone 
when he wanted to. The task then was to get him to the point of wanting to talk 
with the government. On the High Organ, Mandela became primus inter pares for 
the authorities. This observation is consistent with Sparks’ view. For example, 
Sparks believes that 
the purpose of the government’s talks with Mandela was to explore the possibility of co-
opting him as leader of… moderates—perhaps along with members of the exiled ANC 
whom the government’s analysts regard as nationalists and moderates, as compared 
with the communists and other militants. (Sparks, 1994, p. 71; my emphases; but see p. 
85 for Thabo Mbeki’s role in this outcome) 
Indeed, Jimmy Kruger, when he was still minister of justice, had said, 
“Mandela, we can work with you, but not your colleagues. Be reasonable” 
(Mandela, 1994, p. 507; my emphases).  
  Having firmly established Mandela’s leadership and authority, segregation 
from the flock makes sense, toward nurturing some measure of independence and 
further differentiations in leadership tactics. According to Sparks, for example, 
The decision to send Mandela [to Victor Verster] had been taken by the committee of 
officials who were meeting with him. “We wanted him to be in a decent place where he 
could receive people and start playing the political role that we had in mind for him,” 
says Niël Barnard, the National Intelligence Service chief whom Mandela realized was 
the key figure on the committee. (1994, p. 39) 
As Skinner noted in Science and Human Behavior, “in the long run the use of 
force usually gives way to other techniques which employ genuine processes of 
behavior. Here the controller need not have power to coerce or restrain behavior 
directly but may affect it indirectly by altering the environment” (1953, pp. 315-
316; see also Cohen & Filipczak, 1989). A taste of the good life therefore appears 
appropriate; hence, Pollsmoor and Victor Verster. At Pollsmoor, for example, 
compared to life on Robben Island, the “pleasures” were worlds apart. They 
included luxuries in rights and facilities (e.g., see Mandela, 1994, p. 501), food 
with meat and vegetables (p. 502), newspapers and magazines including Time and 
Guardian Weekly, radio, better visiting areas and better view of visitors—a 
courtesy not normally shown to visitors by prison staff (p. 503). Indeed, Mandela 
was allowed the first contact visit, courtesy of W. O. James Gregory, at 
Pollsmoor, not to mention improved facilities for gardening for Mandela 
(Mandela, 1994, pp. 504-505). 
The authorities also must have had a good sense of the general goals of the 
ANC and its leadership, for example, as depicted in the Freedom Charter. 
Mandela observed, for example, that Dr. Niël Barnard of the NIS “had made a 
study of the ANC” (1994, p. 525), and Coetsee was quoted as having stated that 
he “had read a lot” about Mandela (Sparks, 1994, p. 24). Note also that, of the 
initial four issues before the secret committee (Mandela, 1994, pp. 525-527), the 
one that appeared to have been resolved early (cf. Mandela’s list of enduring 
problem areas for the committee; 1994, p. 535) was nationalization of the 
economy, an issue raised by the Freedom Charter (see Mandela, 1994, p. 527). 
The Freedom Charter then would have provided the authorities a window to the 
general outlines of the outcome to which the ANC leadership aspired, and around 
which they could tailor their own final outcomes in designing a desirable goal to 
strive for in molding the ANC leadership in captivity, especially Mandela. For the 
purposes of implementing some form of shaping program, the Freedom Charter, 
in conjunction with the confiscated Mandela’s manuscripts and other sources, 
would have aided the authorities in many ways. For example, echoes of the 
Freedom Charter ring in the words of Wimpie de Klerk, on the Mells secret 
meetings with the exiled ANC: “Look, boys, everything is OK. We can do 
business with the ANC. They are not that radical. They are willing to negotiate. 
They are willing to compromise. They see the Afrikaners as an indigenous part of 
South African population. They are not that dangerous. There’s a flexibility even 
in their economic outlook” (Sparks, 1994, p. 80). The foregoing go a long way to 
show that in determining the current status of either verbal or nonverbal behaviors 
to be subjected to shaping at the start of the program as specified by the second 
pertinent rule of shaping (Galbicka, 1994), these kinds of information would have 
been very valuable. 
By the time they released all the leaders in captivity, talking about 
negotiations had become firmly established in Mandela’s repertoire. In addition, 
the basic issues of concern to the government had been pursued extensively with 
him by the presidential working group that the authorities would not have to 
worry what Mandela did or said thereafter. In the final analysis, the map for the 
long walk to freedom seems drawn by the apartheid system and the men and 
women who ran it,ix as Mandela’s own accounts indicate that he remained true to 
the “negotiations” beyond captivity! The convergence of the political ambitions 
nursed, apparently clandestinely at various points on the journey, by Nelson 
Mandela and the covert molding, apparently undertaken by the authorities on the 
ANC leadership and Mandela particularly, more likely than not, produced the 
political status quo in the South Africa that followed his release. True to the spirit 
of “reconciliation” (see note 5), Nelson Mandela, the presidential candidate: 
I told white audiences that we needed them and did not want them to leave the country. 
They were South Africans just like ourselves and this was their land too. I would not 
mince words about the horrors of apartheid, but I said, over and over, that we should 
forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all, (1994, p. 606) 
 evidencing a commitment that was part of the objectives of the government as 
expressed by Kobie Coetsee noted above. Undoubtedly, Mandela played a 
significant role in the process. 
MANDELA’S ROLE IN THE SHAPING PROCESS 
For the purposes of the analysis presented here, it is important to appreciate 
the dynamic nature of the shaping process. According to Galbicka, “[o]rganisms 
and environments continuously shape the behavior of other organisms by 
providing consequences differentially following particular responses 
demonstrating certain criterion characteristics” (1994, p. 739). Indeed, he points 
out further, “[t]he contingencies that shape effective shaping are themselves found 
in the effectiveness of interactions between trainer and client, and will necessarily 
 vary with a change in either or both of the individuals” (Galbicka, 1994, p. 740). 
In the present case, the trainer and the trainee, respectively, sought a common 
end, perhaps with quite different objectives. 
At some point along the way on Mandela’s journey, most probably in the 
later years on Robben Island when prison conditions were considerably relaxed 
(Part 9), he appears to have decided that he wanted to be chief, prime minister, or 
president of all the peoples of South Africa.x His problem then became how he 
would achieve this, not so much if he would. Moreover, he was in a prime 
position, as the head of the High Organ of the ANC in prison, to steer the ship 
toward that goal. For example, Mandela (after meeting with Kobie Coetsee, the 
minister of justice, in Cape Town in 1986), in his own words: 
I told no one of my encounter. I wanted the process to be under way before I informed 
anyone. Sometimes it is necessary to present one’s colleagues with a policy that is 
already a fait accompli. I knew that once they examined the situation carefully, my 
colleagues at Pollsmoor and in Lusaka would support me. (Mandela, 1994, p. 519) 
When Oliver Tambo in Lusaka did get wind of Mandela’s discussions with 
the government, he demanded to know what they were about, fearing Mandela 
might be committing “an error in judgement.” Mandela: 
I replied to Oliver in a very terse letter saying that I was talking to the government 
about one thing and one thing only: a meeting between the National Executive of the 
ANC and the South African government. I would not spell out the details, for I could 
not trust the confidentiality of the communication. I simply said the time had come for 
such talks and that I would not compromise the organization in any way. (1994, p. 524) 
Nelson Mandela was literally imposing, single-handedly,xi the talks on the 
ANC. The rationale for these automorphic actions is comprehensible only in the 
wider context of his desires. Before assumption of talks with the government, 
Mandela wrote: 
I chose to tell no one what I was about to do. Not my colleagues upstairs nor those in 
Lusaka. The ANC is a collective, but the government had made collectivity in this case 
impossible. I did not have the security or the time to discuss these issues with my 
organization. I knew that my colleagues upstairs would condemn my proposal, and that 
would kill my initiative even before it was born. There are times when a leader must 
move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his 
people the right way. (1994, p. 514; my emphases) 
There was neither security nor time to discuss the issues with his own 
colleagues, but with the very embodiment of the enemy they all stood against. 
Moreover, he started the talks knowing that his colleagues would object. By 
moving ahead of the flock, Mandela had resumed the machinations of his own 
 designsxii— “opportunity” became his watchword, constantly seeking it whenever 
he could find it, but most especially with the Nationalist government of South 
Africa.xiii 
These go to show that Mandela’s personal goal was necessary for the shaping 
process to produce the aftermath of South Africa’s apartheid. The interaction of 
“trainer and trainee” was a necessary condition. Such interaction between 
authority and subject in a political context has been recognized previously (e.g., 
Barlow, 1981; Skinner, 1971). As Skinner put it, “[n]o one responds to a prompt, 
hint or suggestion unless he already has some tendency to behave in a given way. 
When the contingencies which explain the prevailing tendency are not identified, 
some part of the behavior can be attributed to the mind” (1971, p. 93). Skinner’s 
allusion to the mind here, of course, gets to the problem of who then is in control 
(if there is by necessity an interaction between trainer and trainee) and the 
attending issue of who gets credit or blame for the outcomes. 
THE AUTONOMOUS MAN AND A SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR 
According to Skinner, from the proposition that “behavior is shaped and 
maintained by its consequences” (1971, p. 2), two results combine to threaten the 
notion of autonomous man. First, at the analytical level, increasing complexity in 
analyses continue to promote contingencies over previous explanatory concepts 
such as feelings, traits, purposes, intentions, and so on. Second, at the practical 
level, unlike with genetic endowments that change rather slowly, manipulations of 
the environment can produce “quick and dramatic effects” (p. 24) on behavior.  
Traditionally, the autonomous man is considered a free person “in the sense 
that his behavior is uncaused” (p. 25). He is responsible thus for what he does and 
in one sense can be punished for misbehavior whereas in another sense he can 
receive credit and admiration for his accomplishments. From a behavioral 
perspective, the problem with the traditional view of the autonomous man is 
twofold. First, as Skinner pointed out, “a scientific analysis shifts the credit as 
well as the blame to the environment, and traditional practices can then no longer 
be justified” (p. 27). Second, he noted further, “by questioning the control 
exercised by autonomous man and demonstrating the control exercised by the 
environment, a science of behavior also seems to question dignity and worth” (p. 
26). These problems clearly are manifested in the present analysis, first by the 
manner in which Mandela is regarded in the aftermath of his release and 
ascension to the presidency, and second, by the apparent potential to deny him 
credit for what he has achieved for South Africa. 
 MANDELA’S SAINTLY AURA 
Upon his release in 1990, Mandela told a throng of well wishers: “I stand 
here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you the people” (p. 
676). Of his separation from Winnie Mandela in April 1992, Mandela wrote: “She 
married a man who soon left her; that man became a myth; and that myth returned 
home and proved to be just a man after all” (p. 592). Man or myth, the text of 
Mandela’s autobiography suggests that he acquired a saintly aura, 
notwithstanding his claim to that throng of well-wishers. Granted the complexity 
of the content and function of remembering (Ross & Buehler, 1994) and the 
intricate properties of the remembering self (Bruner, 1994), there is evidence that 
autobiographical memory is not necessarily self-serving (e.g., Wagenaar, 1994). 
Thus, we may not conclude that Mandela’s self-aggrandizement is responsible for 
the portrayal of this aura in his autobiography. The question remains then as to 
how this saintly disposition that surrounds Mandela’s person and life comes 
about. 
According to Skinner,  
We recognize a person’s dignity or worth when we give him credit for what he has 
done. The amount we give is inversely proportional to the conspicuousness of the 
causes of his behavior. If we do not know why a person acts as he does, we attribute his 
behavior to him. The goodness to which good behavior is attributed is part of a person’s 
worth or dignity and shows the same inverse relationship to the visibility of control. We 
attribute the greatest goodness to people who have never behaved badly and hence have 
never been punished, and who behave well without following rules. Jesus is usually 
portrayed as such a person. (1971, p. 72) 
Clearly, on the aftermath of his release and ascension to the presidency, 
Mandela was so widely admired, almost to a saintly proportion (e.g., see 
Meredith, 1997; Sparks, 1994). There continue to be references, even today more 
than ten years thence, to this saintly ascriptionxiv (e.g., Williamson, 2008), 
although some have began to question it (e.g., Hounshell, 2007; Roberts, 2008; 
SAPA, 2004). The ascription is in large part because people tend to appraise him 
on his suffering, endurance, perseverance, and triumph in the face of adversity 
and injustice. The kind of analysis I have undertaken here, however, would appear 
to deny him (and others) that very credit and/or admiration. I am thus compelled 
to note that I have not personally set out to achieve this as a goal. If that is the 
outcome, however, it derives from the nature of the beast, not from some 
deliberate effort to deny him and others credit they may deserve.xv I should note 
too that it is not always the case that people get credit and/or admiration for their 
suffering under conditions of incarceration for political reasons. Barlow (1981) 
presented the case of the Ricketts who were imprisoned by the Chinese in the 
1950s. The Ricketts are noted as saying “We found this a tremendously up-lifting 
experience, but when we returned home and tried to tell the American people 
through the press something about our life in prison, many immediately labelled 
[sic] us `brainwashed’” (Barlow, 1981, p. 307). 
CONCLUSIONS 
As noted in the foregoing, the value of the discovery of the scripts of 
Mandela’s memoirs on Robben Island would have provided valuable information 
on the ANC leadership in captivity and abroad. Together with other sources of 
information, it would have enabled the authorities to conduct a systematic, covert 
work on the ANC leadership in captivity, particularly Mandela. By molding their 
behavior toward goals that are consistent with and desirable to the authorities, 
they had set in motion a sequence of events designed ultimately to change the face 
of South African political life for good. I have argued that this may well have 
happened, systematically or otherwise, through a shaping process. 
I mentioned previously in the introduction that it might be possible to 
establish that indeed a program was put in place by the South African authorities 
to change the mind or behavior of their captives. Nevertheless, is an actual 
program of shaping needed to affirm the validity of the analysis presented here? I 
think not, for two reasons. First, as noted above, the accounts of other 
protagonists in the Mandela saga, such as those provided by Sparks (1994) would 
shed more light on the process that produced the political outcome in South 
Africa. Of particular interest would be the effects of the countercontrol measures 
devised by the ANC and the prisoners at various stages of the struggle against the 
apartheid system on the various actors involved in running it. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, although shaping in the laboratory often requires an 
agent, namely the experimenter, shaping in the real world needs no agency to 
work—the shaping is effected by the interaction of the behaving organism with its 
physical or social environment, its behavior, and the prevailing (social) 
contingencies. This is the crux of the idea of selection by consequences (Skinner, 
1981). Being retrospective, one could argue that the present analysis has the 
benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Nevertheless, there is a pattern here too compelling to 
ignore. This is what led me to explore them in some detail. 
Finally, some ethical concerns do arise from this kind of analysis, especially 
given recent geopolitical developments and treatment of detainees. One could 
raise the question, for example, whether from the perspective of cultural design 
such as Skinner (1971) offers, the shaping process, which included the 
countercontrol measures deployed by Mandela and his colleagues, was ethically 
good to the extent that it resulted in the survival of the extant South African state. 
 The answer depends on what other perspective one brings to it, and such 
perspectives abound; namely, humanism, Pan-Africanism, nationalism, 
multiracialism, liberalism, etc., etc. As noted above, for example, the type of 
conservatism Chinweizu (1994) brings to it would consider what happened in 
Mandela’s case abhorrent and question the “goodness” of the outcome, regardless 
of how humane it was, compared to alternative methods such as torture in recent 
news. Another ethical concern is whether this kind of analysis could serve as a 
primer for oppressive governments to shape the behavior of human rights and 
other activists. As Skinner aptly noted, talking about behavioral technology, 
“[s]uch a technology is ethically neutral. It can be used by villain or saint. There 
is nothing in a methodology which determines the values governing its use” 
(1971, p. 148). Perhaps a solution would be to inform activists of such tactics and 
approaches to resisting them. According to Skinner, “[t]he great problem is to 
arrange effective countercontrol and hence to bring important consequences to 
bear on the behavior of the controller” (1971, p. 168). The culture at large, in the 
final analysis, determines what is good for its survival and its values in how it 
treats those it perceives as some kind of threat, as the apartheid system did. The 
roles we play as experts or professionals is an integral part of that cultural 
process, which explains the recent position the APA (2006, 2009) has taken on 
the question of torture of detainees. Perhaps this kind of analysis proffers a 
different approach in the arsenal of tools available as the debate on alternatives to 
torture continues. 
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ENDNOTES 
i This is akin to the considerable interest focused on issues of brainwashing in the 
psychological literature in the 1950s concerning experiences of American 
prisoners in China and Korea (e.g., see Bauer & Schein, 1957; Fairbank, 1993) 
and attendant thought reform techniques employed. 
ii de Waal is not included in Figure 1 because his involvement, from Spark’s 
account, was mostly regarding Winnie Mandela. 
iii The account is remarkable in its detail of coverage and content. Mandela is said 
to have “a personality trait that has astonished many who have met [him] since his 
release, and that it is his close attention to personal detail, his almost card-index 
memory for people which enables him to recognize men and women he may not 
have seen for years or may have met only briefly in a crowd,”—a view shared by 
Nadine Gordimer, the Nobel literature laureate (Sparks, 1994, pp. 46-47). 
iv Of those moved to the Pollsmoor prison, Mlangeni was the only nonmember of 
the High Organ. According to Sparks, “… Govan Mbeki [was] the oldest of the 
leaders arrested at Rivonia, a lifelong member of the Communist Party, and the 
leading figure in the radical group. Fellow prisoners on Robben Island recall a 
particularly sharp exchange in 1968 when Mandela initiated a debate in the 
Higher Organ on whether the ANC should start thinking about how to open lines 
of communication with the government. Mbeki was outraged and, say some, 
retained a lingering suspicion of Mandela’s ‘moderation’ after that.” (1994, p. 
58). Several points are noteworthy here. First, that Mandela’s account, in all its 
detail and coverage (see note 3) left out the clash with Mbeki over talks (e.g., see 
Mandela, 1994, p. 428). Second, Govan Mbeki was notably left behind on 
Robben Island by the authorities when the High Organ was moved to Pollsmoor 
Prison. Finally, in most traditional African cultures, there is a pecking order in 
leadership grounded in generational seniority. Both the authorities and Mandela 
must have been keenly aware of this. Yet, on the one hand, the authorities sought 
to violate it by picking Mandela over Mbeki, not withstanding their ideological 
differences. On the other hand, any actions taken by Mandela to subvert it would 
be considered insolent and, in a political context, ambitious by traditional 
standards (see Norman-Smith, 1976, for a description of the practice in Transkei 
culture). 
v Sparks offers insights into the maneuvers surrounding this offer in the inner core 
of government, and the complications resulting from it for President Botha and 
his team. Of the offer, Sparks observed,  
But Coetsee argued against it. “I had studied the man and I knew he would never accept 
this,” he says. “There was no way Mandela was going to renounce the ANC’s armed 
struggle, for which he had spent all those years in prison” (1994, p. 49). This statement 
by Coetsee is revealing, for, at that time, he had not met Mandela in person but he knew 
enough to come to that judgement. Indeed, Coetsee admits, “… I had read a lot about 
him—all his speeches and all those reports that came across my desk everyday…” 
(Sparks, 1994, p. 24; my emphases).  
In the end, his knowledge of Mandela paid off: 
The only benefit to flow from Botha’s bungled release offer was that it increased 
Coetsee’s credibility as an adviser… Gradually, Coetsee was able to bring them [Botha 
and his cabinet] around to accepting a new formula that would get over the difficulty of 
requiring Mandela to renounce violence. He would be asked to commit himself only to 
“positive development and reconciliation,” without having to renounce anything. 
Coetsee knew from his discussions with the prisoner that he would agree to this. 
(Sparks, 1994, p. 51; my emphases) 
The discussions, of course, emanated from the secret committee meetings being 
held with Mandela. 
vi Sparks suggests that this visit was instigated by the chance meeting on a flight 
en route Cape Town between Winnie Mandela and Kobie Coetsee (see Sparks, 
1994, p. 21). Coetsee was apparently rather impressed by Nelson Mandela at this 
meeting, their first: “He came across as a man of Old World values… an old 
Roman citizen with dignitas, gravitas, honestas, simplicitas” (Sparks, 1994, p. 
24). It was at this meeting when, Mandela recalled, “… [a]t one point [Coetsee] 
said to me, ‘I am interested in your being put in a situation between prison and 
freedom.’ I asked him whether he meant my whole group of prisoners, and he said 
no, just me. I was worried about that because it would look as though there was a 
 deal, but I didn’t say anything about it to him. All I said was, ‘Well, your coming 
here cuts down our problems by 25 percent’” (Sparks, 1994, p. 25; my emphases).  
Yet, he dissuaded his colleagues from protesting the separation—they were 
allowed to meet only as dyads rather than in a group! 
vii The EPG visit may have been a decisive event in the scheme of things. Of the 
visit, Sparks wrote: “Coetsee was there at the start of the second meeting but he 
did not stay, even though Mandela invited him to. ‘I wanted him to feel that he 
was in charge, that he was the host,’ Coetsee explains today. ‘I was so struck by 
his presence. It was absolutely remarkable—his alertness, his composure, his 
bearing, the way he met these people as though he had been a pinstriped leader all 
his life. That was a crucial impression for me I think that was the day I realized 
this could be the man’” (Sparks, 1994, p. 33; my emphases)—the chosen one. In 
effect, the scheme was working. 
viii Of the cottage, Mandela wrote: “The cottage did in fact give me the illusion of 
freedom. I could go to sleep and wake up as I pleased, swim whenever I wanted, 
eat when I was hungry—all were delicious sensations. Simply to be able to go 
outside during the day and take a walk when I desired was a moment of private 
glory” (Mandela, 1994, p. 533; my emphases). 
ix According to Sparks, “It was the Broederbond [the Afrikaner secret 
brotherhood] which had first devised the apartheid ideology and functioned as the 
primary think tank for shaping government strategy thereafter” (1994, p. 72; my 
emphases). Others included business people, at home in South Africa and abroad, 
academics and other professionals, and government operatives at the helms of the 
affairs of state such as the Coetsees, the Barnards, the Steyns and the Willemses, 
and so on. These same hands that ran the apartheid machine decided to change the 
oil, but found that the engine needed an overhaul. Sparks: “…after the later 1970s 
[the Broederbond’s] role began to change as more Afrikaner intellectuals 
perceived the need for reform [my emphases]. It became the main agency for 
trying to find a way out of the Afrikaner’s historic dilemma: how to abandon 
apartheid and come to terms with the black majority without losing control of the 
country [my emphases] and ultimately the national identity of the Afrikaner volk” 
(1994, p. 72). Sparks reported that P. W. Botha “and his senior ministers… met 
periodically with the Broederbond executive at a secret mountain retreat called 
Hawekwa, near the Western Cape Town of Wellington, to discuss ideas on 
political transformation” (1994, p. 74). See also Figure 1. 
x At least the authorities, on different occasions, offered Mandela to move to the 
Transkei, his home province, to retire and, presumably, to resume some political 
role at the provincial level in his capacity as adviser to the regent. Mandela turned 
down all such offers on the grounds of his opposition to the homeland policy of 
the apartheid system; for example, see Mandela (1994, pp. 468-469). 
xi In Sparks’ account, by 1986, at about the time Mandela was seeking talks with 
the government, the chairman of the Afrikaner Broederbond, Pieter de Lange, met 
members of the ANC at the Ford Foundation conference in New York. At that 
conference, he met and “lunched” with Thabo Mbeki, then the Director of 
Information of the ANC. The ANC in exile was curious and sought contacts of its 
own both within and around government circles. Sparks described a network of 
contacts (1994, pp. 76-79) diagrammed in Figure 1. But when time came for 
government to initiate contacts with them, “Mandela was adamant in refusing to 
sanction any form of direct contact between the government and the ANC in 
exile. He remained suspicious of the government’s motives, believing they would 
try to drive a wedge between himself and his colleagues outside the country… 
[But] without informing Mandela of his intentions, [Niël] Barnard asked 
Esterhuyse to get in touch with [Thabo] Mbeki and set up a secret meeting with 
the NIS.” (Sparks, 1994, pp. 109-110). 
xii Back in May 1961, following the failed stay-at-home campaign, Mandela had 
proclaimed the end of non-violent struggle to the press. He wrote: 
It was a grave declaration, and I knew it. I was criticized by our Executive for making 
that remark before it was discussed by the organization, but sometimes one must go 
public with an idea to push a reluctant organization in the direction you want it to go. 
(Mandela, 1994, p. 258; my emphases) 
These were the words of the man who, in another context while damning the 
newly formed PAC members who in 1959 broke away from the ANC for its non-
Africanist policies embodied in the Freedom Charter, says: 
I have always believed that to be a freedom fighter one must suppress many of the 
personal feelings that make one feel like a separate individual rather than part of a mass 
movement. One is fighting for the liberation of millions of people, not the glory of one 
individual. (Mandela, 1994, p. 215) 
Well, one cannot ignore what a memento mori does to such a view. Commenting 
on his goal and desire for “a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa based 
on one-person one-vote on a common voters’ roll” upon his first visit to Soweto 
when he was released, Mandela wrote: “It was the dream I cherished when I 
entered prison at the age of forty-four, but I was no longer a young man, I was 
seventy-one, and I could not afford to waste any time” (1994, p. 560; my 
emphases). 
xiii See, for example, chapters 88-96 in Mandela (1994). 
 xiv A Google search for “Nelson Mandela as saint” yielded over a million hits, 
albeit not all specifically addressing the ascription. 
xv Others (e.g., Chinweizu, 1994; Bofelo, 2008), by the way, would be 
vociferously opposed to Mandela and his actions, including his views on 
multiracialism. For example, according to Chinweizu, “Mandela’s liberalism, 
with its dedication to the primacy of multi-racialism, is all set to subvert the 
cardinal goal of returning to the black aborigines of South Africa all the land 
stolen from them by the white invader-settlers.” 
 
 
